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sun and lightning
the visibility of radiance
What is visibility? The question seems simple enough. Yet a brief investigation
quickly leads to complicated answers. If visibility merely matched with the realm
of the eyes, of what we see, of perspective and viewpoint, then it would soon be-
come impossible to say anything about the next thing we see, be it of the same
form or of other forms. Perhaps, then, we could improve the answer by saying
that visibility matches with what we can see, which at least connects what we see
at this moment with that of the next, what we don’t see yet. Then again, how
would we establish that what we see, what we take to be real, coincides with what
the thing allows to be viewed, with what is given? In the end, what is shown is
not the same as what is viewed. Though both are made of the same stuff, so to
speak, the shown is the far larger category: there is always more to see. We feel
the importance of the given as something cumulative, as generosity or wealth.
Visibility is what is given, and that includes the things we see as well as those we
can see and those we might never get to see. That is the brute fact of givenness,
as Whitehead called it1 – though we can question the notion of bruteness. It is
more a matter of kindness: when things exist to be visible, the structure of the
visible must coincide with that of existence. If they weren’t of one kind, it would
be impossible to link the substance of the one to the pure accident of the other. If
visibility differs so fundamentally from perspective or viewpoint, it must amount
to a form of radiance or luminosity, a light emanating from things, not a light
cast on them by an external source but one independent of the time of day, of the
state of our minds, even of our presence.2 Radiance, then, is visibility as generosity,
a gift that keeps on giving, and, as the rules of gift exchange prescribe, a gift that
needs to be returned. 
    Undoubtedly, enormous consequences follow when things-in-themselves are
identical to the way they show themselves, especially for their internal structure.
They exist in the visible before we get to see them. Philosophically, this statement
signifies the conflation of the for-itself and the for-others. Things are born in the
arena of presence, without any backstage, basement or any other space behind the
curtain – they acquire the status of image long before reaching our consciousness.
However we define thought, intelligence or consciousness, it exists before we re-
spond to it with our own. The crucial question then logically arises: How do ex-
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thing can only be made as an image: all the parts strive for visibility. Parts do not
merely strive to collaborate but do so at the verge of the visible: a horizon drawn
at the source of visibility, not at its limits. Things don’t show themselves against
a background; they project themselves forward. And every sense of solidity, ex-
tensity or depth we generally associate with the real is a product of this projec-
tion.
    The circle dance seems a viable model to explain the concept of belonging, be-
cause it touches upon many of belonging’s aspects. It clarifies the confusion be-
tween the whole and the parts, the one and the many, yet more importantly,
between movement and standstill. The fact is, while the participants in the dance
move around energetically, the circle itself stands still. That is the whole point of
being a circle. The circle does not rotate; it stands. Deploying that word is critical,
as becomes clear from the root of the word existence, which lies in the Latin sistere
(as in consist, assist, insist, resist, persist, etc.), which means “stop” or “stand still.”4
In light of this, we could improve the last proposition as follows: the circle doesn’t
rotate horizontally; it stands vertically. Yet the “stance” is one that persists without
being prefixed with the usual “sub,” since it lacks the order – mathematical or oth-
erwise – to support its roundness. Members actively finding one another, going
along with one another, causes the building – elevating, erecting – of an image, a
surface directed toward visibility. Therefore, the model of the circle dance also
helps to clarify the confusion between stillness and radiance. Stillness could easily
be mistaken for an immobile center, and it has been, too often to mention. We
should consider the still circle as pointing outward, not inward. While the circle
doesn’t rotate, it does radiate; more precisely, it radiates horizontally. It is pure
visibility. If there is a thickness to things that defines their reality, it must be the
thickness of radiance.
    At this point, the whole argument about existence turns into one of beauty,
which amounts precisely to the congruence of visibility and radiance. Seeing par-
takes in the more-to-see, certainly, but this is only possible when the more-to-see
is structured in a way that allows for seeing. We can say a lot about Plato, and we
will, but he not only made stoppage and visibility coincide, he also conceived both
as fundamental to radiance and beauty. As will become quite evident, this rea-
soning relies on an alternative view of Plato; however, it incorporates a number
of his central concepts in a structure that is surprisingly consistent. In this view,
the parts do not simply implode into a dark whole we can only retrieve with
supreme knowledge; what occurs is in fact a reversal of order: the parts now ra-
diate off the whole, and do so purely in the realm of the visible, yet, as in Plato’s
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ternal visibility and internal structure coincide? First and foremost, it means that
what we call “parts” or “properties” are not – contrary to what the terms imply –
owned by an invisible source, by some hidden essence or order. A thing does not
“have” properties; a whole does not “have” parts. Ownership would not allow prop-
erties to be given, to be distributed and circulated freely under the public eye. No,
the whole must be as present as its properties, as its parts. The parts need to be
understood as loose and available while simultaneously being parts of a whole.
Radiance implies that the parts have been sent out, that they are being distributed,
or more precisely, being given. From a spatial point of view, they cannot be seen
as being tied to or seated in a place but rather as being from a place, a place they
belong to. Being a property, then, is a matter of membership, not ownership. Be-
longing is etymologically equal to “going along with,” making the expression that
parts belong to a whole identical to saying that parts go along with one another,
or better, belong to one another. Things are brotherhoods, their parts like members
of a circle, or even a round table, where many parts make up one circular object,
as in a necklace or a circle dance. 
    Let us explore the schematics of the circle for a moment. Circles are frequently
used as schematic depictions of things, either in their singular state or as wholes
containing parts, as when we draw a circle surrounding multiple smaller ones.
Years ago, Gilles Deleuze proposed in a lecture making the distinction between a
circle and a round,3 the former being defined by a midpoint, the latter being with-
out one and merely defined by the activity on the line itself. A round may be wob-
bly when we draw it by hand, or angular when we drive around the block, or
completely irregular, as in a tour, such as that of a house or the traditional Grand
Tour of Europe. And a necklace or circle dance is likewise a round in the Deleuzian
sense; the dance has no exact middle and its participants move sideways, often
switching directions while holding hands, sometimes around a pole, but not nec-
essarily. For our purposes, though, we should stick to the word “circle,” since the
continuing use of “round” would quickly become confusing. What matters at this
point is that in the act of belonging, the parts of a whole do not converge in some
absent middle or core but at the periphery, and that the periphery consists of a
single line. This model contrasts considerably with the classic parts-whole model
of things, in which the parts are the contents of the whole. In that model, which
is one of ownership, the whole is always depicted as if it is a container or a bag,
while in the model of membership, the parts align on the circle itself. In this sense,
things – the gatherings of parts – are to be understood as completely superficial,
because the line has no thickness. Objects might take up volume; things do not. A
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sun and ekphanestaton
For centuries, the quintessential model of radiance and the radiant circle has been,
of course, the sun. In modern eyes, the sun is either viewed as the machine of vis-
ibility, the external source that illuminates all things on earth, or, at best, as a
metaphor for radiance. But the sun is neither machine nor metaphor, since radiance
is visibility as generosity, not visibility in general. In a similar vein, we recognize
the sun as a model of generosity in our own age, for instance in Bataille’s concept
of “pure expenditure” as theorized in his Accursed Share. Yet his notion of gen-
erosity was disconnected from visibility, if not violently joined to its opposite,
blindness, as in Story of the Eye. Bataille’s concepts of pure expenditure and excess
were mainly based on the twentieth-century myth of what in anthropology was
called the “pure gift,”9 the gift that cannot possibly be returned, an idea that we
should understand as far more closely related to the aesthetic of the sublime than
to that of beauty, since it invariably evokes awe and fascination: feelings of fix-
ation, not of circulation.
    Radiance, in contrast, relates the gift directly to visibility. The sun is the ulti-
mate model for relating the handing over of an object to the object showing itself.
It is not just a model of visibility and generosity; it is a model of visibility as gen-
erosity. As said, this is an idea that goes back thousands of years. For instance, in
ancient Egyptians’ depictions of the sun god Aten, we see the sun’s rays ending in
stylized open hands – not very surprising when we realize their word for “ray”
also meant “hand.” Such connections between light and the gift are widespread.
At various times and places, we find the sun depicted as a disk with hands attached
to it, or described as being “five-fingered” or “golden-handed.”10 Likewise, in
Homer and Hesiod, sunrises are given the adjective “rosy-fingered”; the fingers
are sometimes accompanied by golden arms.11 These are just a few examples from
what the nineteenth-century philologist Max Müller called comparative mythol-
ogy, though expanding on his arguments on solar deities is not my aim here. My
point is that from very early on the sun was not merely equated with light; its
light was also equated with the gift. We see with our eyes, but the sun shines with
its hands. This notion of radiance follows the same model I have discussed else-
where12 in explaining the transformation of the gift into the Greek notion of charis,
mostly translated as “grace,” and again from charis into beauty: multiple hands
radiating from the object, linking gentility, warmth and kindness with the shininess
of gold and adornment. The ancient Greeks were obsessed with beauty and grace,
of course, and invariably associated them with shining, gleaming or glowing. We
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doctrine, outside the realm of time. What was blind process – parts gathering into
a whole – is now sheer beauty – parts radiating from a whole. Radiance cannot
occur without stoppage. But stoppage is not to be confused with rest. Beauty makes
things step out of time and switch to another type of movement – one that exceeds
actuality – and to a visibility that exceeds perspective. In this sense, the standing
image is not superficial at all; it merely exchanges the better-known depth between
outer appearance and inner structure for an outwardly oriented depth, a depth that
is intensely engaged with its environment, with the political space of views, feel-
ings and moods – and this might involve lies as well as truths, trickery as well as
authenticity, cunning as well as intelligence, because, in the end, beauty could not
care less about any of these options: they are merely ways plants, humans and
animals make use of its powers.
    Now that we have entered the perilous world of Greek metaphysics, it cannot
hurt to recall the illustrious words of Heraclitus: “We never cross the same river
twice,” and “Everything flows.”5 How should we respond to these with the above
paragraphs in our minds? As in the case of the circle dance, we could safely re-
spond with a resounding “No, it is the water that flows, not the river” – in fact,
the river stands still. While the water moves, the river comes to a stop, or, to phrase
it somewhat less abstractly, the river is established, a word that directly relates to
stability and standing. The horizontal movement of the water turns into the vertical
posture of the river. Evidently, this stoppage is of a wholly Platonic nature. How-
ever, instead of directly concluding, as Plato did, that the river retreats from the
visible into the realm of the mental, the ideal or even the eternal, we should ac-
knowledge the notion of stoppage without sacrificing any of the given wealth of
visibility. To achieve this, we merely need to reverse the relationship: stoppage is
necessary to the river’s existence, yes, but the excess of visibility sprouts from it
rather than sinking into its shadows. And indeed, Plato, when wisely misquoting
Heraclitus by saying “Everything changes,”6 leaves open the possibility of thinking
the river may regain its movement at the point of standstill, allowing the circle to
wiggle, to pulsate or radiate. From this perspective, we cannot regard Plato as the
philosopher entirely opposed to motion, as Walter Pater did,7 since Plato allows
the river to move in a very different dimension and direction than the stream of
water does; it might not exactly flow, but the river does shine and flicker in its
continuous change. In this sense, Pater’s celebrated “gem-like flame”8 could not
shine any more brightly; however, we should view the light as emitted by Plato’s
gem-like stoppage, not by the Heraclitean flame-like flux. In all its changes, it is
the river that shines, not the water.
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no accident that the image of fortune as a wheel preserves the more ancient struc-
ture of the sun wheel and the sun chariot, which carries the sun either in the form
of a golden disk or in the Greeks’ personified form of Helios, often confused with
Apollo, who also goes by the name of Phoebos, “brightness.” While both are closely
connected to the sun, it is generally assumed that Helios related more to its orbit
and Apollo to its radiance. The sun’s chariot is pulled by four horses, which, Max
Müller argued, are the same horses that in Vedic poetry were given the name the
Haritas, the etymological origin of the Charites, the Greek name for the Three
Graces.17 The connection between the sun and the Graces as the personification of
the gift cycle can perhaps most clearly be seen in the frequent depiction of Apollo
holding a small statue of the Three Graces in one hand and a large bow in the
other, hence offering both the hand of gentility as well as that of striking. In many
ancient languages, the word for sunbeam not only means “hand” but also
“arrow,”18 strongly indicating the ambiguous nature of the gift, which fluctuates
between empowering and overpowering. And, as is well known, we encounter
both models of the sun extensively in Plato. 
    To say the sun occupies an important position in Plato’s philosophy would be
an understatement, to put it mildly. It is not merely the protagonist of his most
famous analogies, serving as a model to explain the notion of Forms; it also keeps
haunting that notion, constantly overturning it with new questions that might as
well be answered by opposing arguments. In fact, his writings are so riddled with
ambiguities that it seems best to consider Plato’s metaphysics as only a small por-
tion of his conceptual machinery. Perhaps it would be a worthwhile experiment to
look at the whole of the Platonic framework as if it were one of those 1970s Rubik’s
Cubes, whose mobile parts we can rearrange to constantly produce new configu-
rations. In this way, we can view Plato’s own metaphysics as a version of Platon-
ism, just as we do Nietzsche’s overturned variant, or Pseudo-Dionysius’ Chris-
tianized Platonism, or Kant’s idealist and Whitehead’s organicist Platonisms – to
name a not-altogether-accidental list of philosophers who dedicated themselves
as much to the cause of beauty as Plato himself. Let us, just for argument’s sake,
postulate two Platos and study their respective “modeling” of the sun. The first is
a joyous version (I), what I would call an “is-Plato,” who believes in one world,
where the sun touches and nourishes the earth, and the second version (II) is the
metaphysicist and moralist, the “ought-Plato,” who believes there are two worlds,
one high up in the light and one caught in the shadows down below.19 Our lives
would be a lot easier if, instead of agreeing or disagreeing with Plato (which in
the end can only be a futile undertaking), we could distinguish the two clearly
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should note, however, that the hands of the gift are also those of making, as well
as those of touching and seizing, sometimes even striking. Things handle their vis-
ibility; they make us see. 
    With the sun regularly related to the gift, both gold and fortune were readily
implicated. Gold follows the radiant model of the sun, shedding warmth and gen-
tility, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra said, adding that gold “always gives itself.”13 In
this sense, gold is not merely something that wants to be handed over; it shows
itself as a handing over. Gold streams, as we know very well from fairy tales, such
as the story of the goose that laid the golden eggs; myths, such as that in which
Danaë is showered in Zeus’s golden rain; and religious imagery, such as St.
Theresa’s penetration by a golden spear and the Virgin Mary’s conception of Jesus,
which traversed “like a sunbeam through glass,” as medieval theologians used to
describe it.14 Interpreting these stories as metaphors for latent truths (such as di-
vinity, psychic energy, libido, or the like) would not do justice to their structure.
Not only does the object of the sun mirror the radiance of the gift; its trajectory
likewise mirrors the cyclical nature of fortune and fate. This implicitly makes the
sun’s passage across the sky a model of the gift cycle where its radiance is received
by the earth and returned as growth. It is not mere pleasure, wisdom or wealth we
get from radiance but our own growth. Nothing is more essential in gift exchange:
not simply based on the going back and forth of goods but on improvement and
increase. This is why the gift cycle is embodied by three stages, not two agents,
such as object and subject or sender and receiver. These three stages are, as Marcel
Mauss described them, “the three obligations: giving, receiving and returning.”15
We recognize the triadic structure of reciprocation in the Three Graces, the ancient
Greek, and later Roman, personification of gift exchange. The goddess Aglaea
stands for the stage of giving, Euphrosyne for receiving and Thalia for returning.
They are the “givers of all increase,”16 as the British classicist Jane Harrison called
them. Though there are many overlaps with the model of the sun, the clearest is
the fact that “Aglaea” means “radiance,” and “Thalia” “bloom”; the name is similar
to that of the goddess Thallo, the Hour of Spring. Sunbeams are not simply shed
across the face of the earth; they are gifts that enhance life on earth, either through
good fortune or through fertility and growth. 
    To classify the gift cycle as an early form of an economy would be to disregard
its reversal of supply and demand: the fortune that proverbially falls into your lap
wasn’t really asked for, and the gold that fell upon you wasn’t exactly earned.
Fortune is a form of luck, that is, a form of favoring or grace. Though gold is a
typically Greek passion and fortune a Roman one, they are strongly related. It is
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shared, it has to go around. If it is true that earthly forms participate in heavenly
Forms through a vertical likeness, then methexis can never be wholly separated
from mimesis, the horizontal likeness between forms, since both share the same
fundamental concept of likeness.27 Yet this conclusion does not lead to an all-out
flattening of encounters, to a carnival of masks and mirrors, since the conflation
of likeness and gift means that the reverse must be true as well: no mimesis can
be successfully accomplished without some methexis. No mask or mirror is without
depth. The horizontal, mimetic relationship between forms necessarily requires a
vertical leap: for one thing to successfully copy another, it needs to exceed itself
and overreach. How else could that self become the other? How else would it excel
and outdo itself? How else would it grow or multiply? How else would it learn
anything? In our earthly, everyday relations, we constantly need to exceed our-
selves in ways that mere horizontality could never explain. 
    Probably those statements contain nothing new, except perhaps in rejecting
the general assumption that any ambiguity of mimesis and methexis should be
explained by saying that mere mirroring of visibilities is impossible because all
things need to pass through the realm of the invisible, the realm of ideas – in short,
by surrendering the argument to Plato II. However, this ambiguity could also in-
dicate that the step from the visible to the visible does not proceed via the invisible
but via an excess of visibility, via a fundamental generosity of things, the more-
to-see that Plato I called an “overflowing treasury.” His argument is more radical
than that of his alter ego: the overreaching of transcendence means precisely to
assume the power of a gift. The seemingly difficult and counterintuitive concept
of a sun with hands means that visibility constitutes a domain where the distance
between the human eye and a thing can be overcome and even reversed. Things
shower us like gold, and there is such an excess of visibility we can hardly draw
or paint them. Things have depth, certainly, though not the usual depth between
the visible and the invisible, or between presence and absence, but between what
they show and what we see, between presence and the present – a depth that lies
not behind an appearance but in front of it. In short, Plato’s introduction of
methexis was an essential addition to mere mimesis, but not a substitution for it;
the two should be understood as necessarily operating in combination.
    Taken together, the verticality of methexis and the horizontality of mimesis
could explain the cyclical nature of exchanges. Without the transcendence of the
gift, its return would be impossible. It means that mirroring and mimicking play
a role similar to gift exchange, with the modeled feeding back into the origin, and
the form into the Form – not just the reverse. The Form that hands over is also the
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and treat them as relatively independent from one another. One version is utterly
positive and believes the wheels of participation and imitation are generative and
productive, while the other operates through negation, viewing earthly matter and
its forms as blocking the sunlight and obstructing our contact with reality.
    The sun, according to Plato I in the sixth book of the Republic, is generous like
an “overflowing treasury,” a source of “generation and growth and nurture” that
constantly “gives birth.”20 Indeed, the sun produces “offspring” in the form of like-
nesses, eidē.21 One paragraph further, he uses even stronger language: the sun lit-
erally “hands over” (parechein) the “power of visibility” to things.22 These are
compelling formulations, and we should be wary of taking them metaphorically,
since they evolved directly from the entwined history of gift-giving and solar
mythology, in which the sun has hands and things are gifts in the form of radiant
images. And the first image of the sun is the eye, the “most sunlike (helioeides) of
the sense instruments,” a phrase later echoed by Goethe and Uexküll.23 Things are
not merely copies of the sun but miniature versions of it, models or modes, which
makes them radiant as well as variable: variations of the golden light of the sun.
It is no secret that the confusion of likeness and form lies at the heart of Plato’s
philosophy, largely because of the fact that they are based on two closely related
concepts: a “horizontal” likeness between things or forms, which Plato II disparages
as mere imitation or mimesis, and a “vertical” likeness in which forms on earth
“participate in” the heavenly Forms, in a procedure he termed methexis. In the
Metaphysics, Aristotle recalls how Plato substituted the Pythagorean concept of
mimesis with methexis,24 in a change we could interpret in different ways. The
usual interpretation is that Plato updated and improved on the old Pythagorean
concept of things imitating each other flatly, which would come down to a com-
plete separation of imitation and participation. The alternative is to view both con-
cepts as inherently linked and overlapping, even as related. 
    In examining the latter thesis, as advocated by Plato I, we see that the notion
of things mimicking the sun coincides with the notion that things partake in the
sun, and partaking is a form of sharing, akin to taking part in gift exchange. Again,
this idea relates visibility to the gift, not to an accident caused by the chance in-
tervention of an external light source. We do not see things because the sun illu-
minates them at some specific hour at some specific place; we see them because
they are “of” the sun, or better – to put it in terms of gift theory – because they
are an “inalienable” part of the sun.25 Though the Greek term methexis does not
as clearly refer to the dynamics of whole and parts as the English “participate,” it
was a term used mostly in the context of gift exchange.26 For something to be
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of the gift and vision: things, as likenesses of the sun, hand over their visibility,
and we “like” them in return, in a returning that strives to close the circle. Natu-
rally, seeing the gift cycle completed is essential for the validity of the argument,
since we might initially think the equation of visibility and generosity constitutes
nothing but metaphor. As stated earlier, the return is not simply a question of the
pleasure of Euphrosyne, who embodies the joyous middle stage of the gift cycle,
but also of the growth and bloom embodied by Thalia. Even the Epicurean, sub-
dued pleasure that Walter Pater commended as a way of mediating between Pla-
tonic stoppage and Heraclitean movement would never be able to guide radiance
back to its origin. This form of pleasure tries to find a middle in a purely linear
system stretching between objective beauty and subjective pleasure; it does not
make the exchange cyclical. Thalia’s growth is what links Aglaea’s generosity to
the generative. A bit further on in the Phaedrus, Plato writes:
… as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did
not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his
beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction
from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat;
for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is
warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he
grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were be-
fore hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting,
become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of
the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form
of the soul; for it was once all feathered.31
Growth it is. Before understanding the feathers as instruments of flight and move-
ment, we should view them formally at first, as outspread arms and as sets of
multi-fingered hands – not unlike the Homerian sunrise. The gift given is returned:
seeing radiance makes one radiant. Undoubtedly, the induction of radiance evolved
directly from the cyclical reciprocation of charis, though Plato never directly dis-
cussed the connection, and maybe deliberately suppressed it.32 We should realize,
however, that Plato’s notion of radiance is preceded by hundreds and hundreds of
years of the ancient Greek obsession with shininess, gold and grace, cultivated in
the context of charis. Radiance as an expansion of gift exchange into beauty and
visibility is an old, collective achievement that goes far beyond Plato. As is well
known, Plato calls this sprouting of wings love. A word of caution to fellow
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Form that is held high by forms. We not only meet things at the intersection of
visibility and generosity, we see them returned as well, fulfilling the obligations
that come with every gift – and with beauty. Beauty turns things into miniature
versions of the sun:
    
But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions;
and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly
through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the
physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would
arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would
come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities;
but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly
seen (ekphanestaton).28
Here, in that last sentence, we finally encounter the word ekphanestaton, a word
highlighted by Heidegger in his detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s attempt to over-
turn Platonism.29 The term is usually translated as signifying a clarity of vision,
but understood more literally it means “shining out” or “shining forth”; in German,
Hervor- or Herausscheinen, variations on Erscheinung, the word for “appearance”
or “phenomenon.”30 Ekphanestaton means beauty is more than appearance,
though, or rather, it means beauty is the appearance of the more. This definition
of beauty not only denies the classic metaphysical postulate that things exist be-
hind their appearance – the usual location of the more – it also denies the opposite,
Nietzschean postulate that things fully coincide with their appearance. Surely there
is depth; there is definitely more to things than the way they look. However, fol-
lowing the Plato of the first order, I would like to argue that this more does not
exceed the realm of appearances, yet it does exceed what we see at a specific mo-
ment. Although this may seem a mysterious formulation, it merely means that
presence transcends the present. Presence is superactual. The magic of beauty is
that it finds a solution to seeing the superactual: taking in enough of the more
without necessarily consuming it all. It is moderation and excess simultaneously:
a gift in the sense that there is more to an appearance than actuality can process,
but not so much that we cannot handle it. In this sense, ekphanestaton should not
be designated as a clear seeing but as a thick seeing, much more dependent on
slowness than on the suddenness of clarity.
    At this point, we shouldn’t concern ourselves with asking what exactly shines
out, what it shines into or how it shines. What matters is primarily the convergence
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plain the nature of the good? No, of course we don’t. The sun is good; or perhaps
it is better expressed mathematically: the sun=good. The mathematical “is” of like-
ness equals the ontological “is” of existence. Therefore, when the sun equals the
Good, visibility equals the Forms. Visibility has wrongly been allied (by phenom-
enology) with what we see, but it is what offers itself to be seen. Things do not
ontologically converge on themselves; they turn toward us. There is no alternative
way of explaining generosity if we do not accept its convergence with visibility.
The sun gives, and the good is giving. It is the likeness and the liking that make
it them ontological. 
    Let us go back for a moment to the river we discussed at the beginning. (Plato’s
mind remained occupied with Heraclitus’ remarks, as Aristotle reports in the Meta-
physics, probably because as a young man he started out as a Heraclitean.)35 When
we look at the river, what do we see? Perhaps we can now refine our earlier answer,
in which we stated that the river stood still: while the water flows past, the river
comes toward us. It radiates, certainly – but what does it show? We have already
noted that stoppage should be viewed more as a switching of directions, or even
of dimensions, than as an actual halting of motion. Stoppage does not entail that
we see a river standing still or that we see the Form of riverness suspended amid
all the motion of the water, like an x-ray through layers of flesh. It is not any river
that we see; on the contrary, we see this river, and we find it absolutely distinct
from every other river. That is why rivers have names, and why there are so many
stories about them. Stoppage is not an essence but a narrow passage, or, less par-
adoxically, a pivot or hinge, in which movement takes place in one direction and
stillness in the other, in the manner of an acrobatic flip in which part of the body
moves and part stays still.36 If the flowing water did not move via the hinge of a
river, it would never be able to distinguish itself and become uniquely this river;
it would just be liquid stuff passing by. As Zarathustra might have said, the river
gives itself: the silveriness, the flickering, the noise, the grandeur, the waves, the
windings, the fish leaving ripples on the surface, even the boats, swans and swal-
lows – it all comes toward us. It does not pass by. And, like Venus in Botticelli’s
Birth of Venus, it comes toward us standing. The magic of that emblematic painting
consists in her paradoxically standing in contrapposto on a shell while moving
forward at high speed.37 Beauty radiates; it comes toward us as a standing image
– that is, as a visibility, not as a picture, photo or single perspective. Likewise, the
river nears, and it nears as this river. As a thing comes closer, it also comes to a
close and takes on its own distinct profile. All that is specific and particular accu-
mulates and adds up. It is made up of images that take on density, that gain weight,
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Freudians and Darwinians: his feeling of love is completely distinct from pleasure
and much closer to fright and anxiety. Love, in Plato’s technical terminology, is a
station before reproduction and birth, including actual childbirth. Of course, we
can only love what is beautiful, but while we love we grow. To simply say love
and charis are “relational” would fail to acknowledge the productive nature of the
generous. Being nourished by the generative makes us generate in turn. The cycle
is perpetually powered by increase. Ultimately, this is the meaning of the oft-cited
tokos en kaloi, the “begetting in beauty,”33 which Diotima explains to Socrates in
the Symposium, and which is the same tokos that in the Republic denotes both
offspring and interest. Though he doesn’t make use of the notion of charis, Plato I
upholds a perfectly circular understanding of radiance, one fully embedded in a
long Greek tradition, while technically connecting the notion of visibility to that
of generosity, and that of generosity to generativity.
    In this cyclical concept of radiance, the sun completely coincides with the good,
a statement that, as a matter of fact, Plato II would never agree with. He would
say the sun is “like” the Good, but not identical with it, thereby separating ap-
pearance from reality. Plato II, the philosopher notorious for his hatred of mimesis
and his mistrust of the arts, makes abundant use of analogies, similes and like-
nesses, while remaining remarkably untroubled by the contradiction. But what,
then, is “likening” exactly? What makes him say the sun is like the good? Does it
like the good? Does the good like the sun? In the cyclical concept of radiance,
likening is nothing but the maintenance – etymologically, the “holding in hands”
– of the cycle. Likeness signifies the receiving, and liking the returning. Along
with connecting beauty to love, Plato also links beauty to the intelligible: intelli-
gibility does not stem from the true but from the good. This is an absolutely stag-
gering statement, as any further reflection immediately makes clear, since the true
is something we uncover and the good something we receive. The primacy of the
good, and of beauty, means consciousness lies with things, with visibilities, and
not with us. Understanding is nothing but things making themselves seen; that is
why we say “I see” when we want to express insight. Understanding is a form of
seeing, i.e., of the standing image, as is evident from the etymological relationship
between eidos and idea, terms Plato used interchangeably.34 All too often, Plato’s
analogies are seen as mere pedagogical tools, in which a comparison is made be-
tween different sets of relations rather than between actual terms. But, honestly,
when in Book VI of the Republic the group Sun-Eye-Visibilities is compared to
the group Good-Mind-Forms, could that analogy be replaced by any other? Do
we really think it is a mere accident of metaphor that Plato chose the sun to ex-
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love those who like us. Plato I fully recognized that this all-out vanity was neces-
sary for the world to function; it is no news Plato II was horrified by it.
    Obviously, Plato II would have us believe the mind sees ghostly, invisible
things. It is not that this is particularly erroneous or untrue, but it does not nec-
essarily follow from the relationship between stoppage, radiance and intelligence.
Indeed, the idea creates more problems than it solves. For instance, to claim that
every stoppage is archived for eternity simply makes events impossible, since it
avoids addressing the production of visibilities. It denies the generosity of the sun;
that is, it literally goes against the direction of gift-giving, which is fundamentally
positive, adding to the world. When the sun, as Plato I argues, showers the earth
with likenesses of itself, who is Plato II to say these likenesses are deficient rip-
offs? Why would things happen at all if likeness was a degradation of visibility?
No, likeness is what is generated by the sun; it hands over radiant images. Radiance
gives and brings; it does not subtract, remove or obscure. In the allegory of the
cave, Plato wants to make us believe that the sun, of all things, is the model of in-
visibility! The reverse is far more convincing: the flat shadows cast against the
wall of the cave are nothing but children of the sun. And they are as brilliant as
the sun. None other than the Plato who falls in love in Phaedrus tells us so: is he
himself not in the grip of the boy with the “fiery eyes,” and not of any shadow?
Beauty always starts out as a trap: it captures. The hands of the gift are those that
take hold of us first; this is the reason we call the need to reciprocate an obligation.
Plato falls under a spell, exactly as do those taken prisoner in the cave, being
chained by the legs and neck – only to immediately start growing wings. He is
only initially overpowered by beauty, then empowered. This turn is nothing but
the final bend in the gift cycle, a re-turn. The good is what empowers, what does
good. Plato is freed because he has fallen for the boy’s beauty. First he becomes
“weak-kneed” (deilos) – as the Greeks relished saying – then he stands up again
and flies away. From movement to stoppage, and from stoppage to movement.
    Plato I viewed the two types of humans described by Plato II (the chained in
the cave and the liberated in the sun) as consecutive phases in a continuous cycle
of capture and liberation, not stages in a moral climbing contest. Being stopped
and being moved belong together as receiving and returning; the cycle turns in
jerks and jolts, fits and starts. Plato I is the inventor of this glorious system, ex-
panding charis into philosophy while establishing beauty as the primary ontolog-
ical category; all is assimilated in a fully cyclical systemacy of thought. He is the
builder of wheels. Plato II, on the other hand, is the builder of ladders, the philoso-
pher who devised the ladder of love in the Symposium and the divided line in the
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that thicken – that are, in short, real. Instead of seeing radiance as an opening up,
as Heidegger would, we should see it more as a coming to a close, the expansion
of an opacity that extends far more deeply into the environment than the actual
spatial position of the object. Logically, because there is too much to see, we cannot
exactly register the extended limit with our eyes; it is not like a second surface,
more like the entering of a zone with blurred edges, like a scent or halo: we can
only “come to see” it or “realize” it. It is exactly here that we require Plato I’s no-
tion of understanding, not as Plato II’s more-than-seeing but rather as a seeing-
of-more.
    Understanding is not really insight, then; not the seeing of a still, ghostly object
through all the movement and change. The seeing-clearly of ekphanestaton is not
a transparent seeing-through (of an idea, order or essence) but a seeing-more, a
cascade and culmination of seeing, wholly unlike the perception of material opac-
ity. When perceiving, we are not thinning the river out into a generic river but
accepting the thickening of this river, moving with it from generic to specific, in
a passing on of the original movement of the gift. If things are surrounded by
halos or nimbuses, by vaghezza or nebulae, seeing itself requires thickening. The
je ne sais quoi of radiance is far more powerful than any possible form of knowl-
edge. What do you actually know when you know what a river is? Understanding
is not retrieving what stands beneath, i.e., its substance; it is the cumulative ful-
fillment of radiance: it lets the visible itself come to a stop at the point when a
thing has completed its course to uniqueness. Though we describe it as a move-
ment, radiance is resolutely atemporal – and the atemporal, by the way, should be
clearly distinguished from the eternal. Radiance is extension itself, a movement
of space, not in space; it is the creation of an aesthetic zone where things can take
place. Things are enveloped in suspense; they are hanging in the air as much as
standing on the ground. Space cannot be generalized or neutralized; if it were
neutral, nothing would ever happen. All things that occur in the sphere of the
river are driven by its specific mood – a mood that can be terrifying, calming, ex-
citing or otherwise, but a mood that is itself not part of the temporal flux. There
is something undeniably Platonic about beauty. One would wish every theory of
beauty struggled to come as close to being Platonist as its time allowed it to be.
Evidently, ekphanestaton aligns with the Plato of the first order, because it is far
more a matter of us being transparent – in Walter Pater’s word, “diaphanous” – to
things than the reverse.38 Things, in a way, see through us. We are but a station
via which things return to themselves, mere mirrors in the pervasive vanity of the
world: a world of likenesses and likings. We love others who are like us, and we
lars spuybroek
112
awestruck, overwhelmed and blown away: words that belong fully to the domain
of the sublime, not of beauty. 
    We should note that Apollo does not simply oppose this model by representing
the solely horizontal; rather, he embodies both directions. The archaic, long since
destroyed colossal statue of Apollo on Delos, his island of birth, carried an enor-
mous bow in its left hand and a full-sized statue of the Three Graces, set on a disk,
in its right.40 The design was often used to signify Apollo’s dual nature, though it
is less known because no statues have survived intact, and only a handful of en-
gravings on ancient coins and descriptions in ancient manuscripts are still in ex-
istence. In a parallel development, Apollo’s more well-known attributes, the bow
and the lyre, became as strongly connected as the bow and the Graces. For exam-
ple, Heraclitus used the bow and the lyre to illustrate his celebrated doctrine on
the harmony of opposites,41 later developed into concordia discors, the maxim of
the Renaissance. Aside from the formal resemblance between bow and lyre, there
is a conceptual one: the bowstring can “sing well and clearly,” as Homer wrote,42
and the music of the lyre can strike at our hearts with a piercing force. The classical
philologist Karl Kerényi describes how “Apollo turns sunlight into music.”43 Not
only is his music radiant, but the rays of the sun are as sharp and lethal as arrows.44
Kerényi also argued that Apollo could not be adequately characterized in terms of
the customary lofty transcendence but combined chthonic darkness and ouranian
clarity in one divinity.45 In a similar vein, the classicist Marcel Detienne speaks of
Apollo’s “profound ambivalence.”46 Apollo could “strike from afar” (hence the ep-
ithet hekebolos) as well as enchant and persuade with his music or his speech. In
other words, Apollo’s dual nature is not so much a question of choice, of either/or,
but of a combination, a doubling of dimensions in which each of his actions takes
place. This combining should be viewed more as a crossbreeding resulting in sin-
gular offspring than as a merging or welding in which the two originals remain
present. Any language-based analysis would at this point be forced to use terms
such as “ambiguity” or “paradox” while failing to acknowledge the nature of this
singularity. From an ontological viewpoint, a thing is never contradictory and
cannot be broken down. The whole argument of radiance and beauty starts here.
    The doubling of dimensions, as we encountered it in the case of mimesis and
methexis, is precisely why we have been discussing the notion that things “take a
turn”; why the gift cycle returns to its origin; and, even more fundamentally, why
circles are round and straight lines are not. Simply put, a straight line does one
thing at a time, while a curve does two. A straight line can decrease or increase a
value, but only by going in opposite directions on the same line; a curve (in our
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Republic that places the intelligible above the visible, and, in the cave allegory,
placed the real world, with its sun, trees and watery reflections, above a cave filled
with illusions. All Plato’s ladders and divided lines replace what he himself called
the power of visibility with the authority of the invisible, mainly by extending the
arena of presence into that of the beyond (epekeina). Plato I is the philosopher of
generosity and gifts, Plato II of generality and universals. Plato I is the philosopher
of circularity, Plato II of linearity. 
lightning and epiphany
In the end, this must be why Plato’s texts are populated as much with imagery of
beauty as of the sublime, and why they often confuse the circular turns of beauty
with the pure verticality of the “high” as we know it from Longinus’ treatise on
the sublime, Peri Hypsous, or “On the High.”39 The confusion of beauty and the
sublime is not specifically Plato’s; this, too, is much older, much more widespread,
and part of a long tradition in the iconography of radiance, relating it to the sun
on the one hand and to lightning on the other. There is no special reason to iden-
tify the sun with its highest position in the sky, fixing it to the blazing light of
midday, when in fact it moves along a circular course that changes it to blood-red
and even pink. Lightning, however, is consistently white, invariably strikes from
above and always breaks through the darkness (even in daytime when storm clouds
have gathered), by turning the invisible visible in a flash. Lightning is the icon of
the linear model, the sun that of the cyclical model.
    To appreciate the distinction more deeply, we should again consult Greek
mythology. Zeus strikes with lightning (keraunos) and terror, while his son Apollo,
radiating sunrays from the spiked crown on his head, shoots arrows. Certainly,
they both strike, but one does so with a jagged sword from above, the other with
a gracious curve from afar. These are two radically different models, and we should
distinguish carefully between them. The first thing that springs to mind is, of
course, that the vertical strike characterizes the angry father and the horizontal
shot the son, the negotiator and persuader. (I would not be the first to state that
Christianity copied this model from the ancient Greeks. In fact, very early depic-
tions of Jesus show him as beardless as Apollo, and with his head surrounded by
the same radiant halo.) The differentiation between the father and son is always
of a structural nature. Zeus personifies the purely vertical: pure authority reflected
by pure awe, and when we meet him – if that’s entirely possible – we can only be
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ing the partitions as mirroring, though this could have helped to identify them as
axes and subsequently to develop them conceptually, for example by accepting
mimesis as part of the systemacy. In the cruciform system, both axes will exert
their influence at any position, while with quadrants, three of the four would re-
main disabled. To be sure, any position will always be covered by one of the quad-
rants, but that quadrant will not play any active role in its positioning. The cross
should not be viewed as a static piece of architecture, like the crossing between
nave and transept, but as an ontological machine that at every instantiation solves
what we could now call the Apollonian equation: to exist, i.e., to be radiant, every
single act or object needs to conciliate the two dimensions of reach and aloofness.
The cross does not divide up; it turns like a wheel by constantly interrelating the
two. The operationality of biaxiality therefore carries far more importance than
the mere fact that the machine resembles a fourfold when it is turned off. Empha-
sizing its structure would be like looking at Apollo’s bow without shooting it –
certainly, the string and arrow are initially perpendicular, but the resultant trajec-
tory is curved. Things combine both horizontality and verticality; along with reach
or outreach, they also need intensity or profundity. And the reverse is as true:
things cannot retreat into their own depths at the cost of not being present – a
conclusion that would surely have been rejected by Heidegger, for whom depth
equaled absence, Abgrund and withdrawal. Shocking though it may be, the circle
as a whole is a continuum, and as such, it relates being fundamentally to presence,
which is why I call it an arena of presence.
    Our exemplary river, with all its changes over the course of the year, reaches
deeply into the environment. The river has such an enormous variety of appear-
ances at its disposal, it would be difficult to name something with more depth. A
blooming flower dangling in the wind along the same river does not reach nearly
as deep, but this is not because of its smaller size, since its scent can carry further
than the apparitions of the river. (A butterfly can smell it from miles away.) No,
the flower reaches less deeply because it is less variable and less complex in its
approach to whatever might enter its sphere. Next to a large number, the river col-
lects a large range of responses, while the flower does not, and indeed need not.
In general, we consider outreach a strategy lacking in depth, an averaging-out of
appearances, similar to, for example, the generic shape of a T-shirt, or the agree-
ableness of the taste of milk to every baby, or of Coca-Cola to every adolescent.
Depth, meanwhile, we usually consider to be a retreat from the public eye, a ten-
dency toward inwardness, or centripetality, as Walter Pater called it,50 were it not
for the fact that no matter what the river does – dry up, freeze over – it is always
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specific case of the cycle, a circle) can decrease and increase values simultaneously.
When you increase one value while decreasing another, the line bends downwards,
and conversely, when you increase both values, it bends upward. And we can re-
peat the whole operation by decreasing the initial value and again either decreas-
ing or increasing the other, respectively causing a down- or upward curvature.
Before this becomes too analytical, let me rephrase it by stating that curves are
not antilinear or nonlinear but bilinear (this is why they are quadratic functions.)
By bending, they equate the influence of two separate values along two sliding
scales, which we call axes. Straightforward linearity is based on ladders that vary
between high and low only. Circularity, in contrast, combines such a vertical axis
with a second axis perpendicular to it, which has values that vary between close
and far. And though one axis does not exactly follow the behavior of the other,
they cannot be fully separated either. While the far-close axis indexes the reach
of things into the environment, i.e., their connectivity or horizontality, the high-
low axis indexes their aloofness, their transcendence or verticality. When dis-
cussing Apollo’s characteristics, the German mythologist Walter Otto called the
young god’s remoteness the most significant, though we would be mistaken to
understand it as a spatial separation exclusively registrable on the axis between
close and far.47 In fact, Apollo’s aloofness helped the deity to thrust his arrows
again and again into the bodies of unfortunate mortals. In the realm of the gods,
there was no killer more ferocious than Apollo, and killing requires absolute near-
ness. In other words, Apollo teaches us that we can have enormous reach into the
world, but not without making use of depth; however, the more we aim for pro-
fundity, the less we will be able to connect. Circularity, then, describes the exact
limits of these extremes in a biaxial system linking horizontal outreach to vertical
aloofness.48
    Obviously, the two axes form a cross – specifically, a Greek cross with equal
arms, what Heidegger coined a Geviert or fourfold, and at first, the structure does
seem to divide itself similarly into four distinct quadrants. To merely acknowledge
this cruciform structure will not suffice, however; the interdependence of the two
axes transforms it into a wheel, which Heidegger himself once called a “round
dance” (Reigen), in a remark he never expanded on to its full consequence.49 The
fact is, the German philosopher was rather vague about the workings of the four-
fold, and that should not surprise us, because in contrast to the double axis, his
isolated quadrants (sky, mortals, gods, and earth) probably hinder operationality
more than enable it. One simply cannot develop the concept of a circle from four
quadrants; only biaxiality can do that. Heidegger never went further than describ-
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equation already inherently contains that of some form of weighing or middling,
with each axis setting a limit to what the other can contribute. The equation of
the circle, by transforming the two axes into interconnected sliding scales, disables
any combination of two maximum or minimum values in one act or object.53 One
cannot achieve both the highest and the furthest, or the lowest and the furthest,
or the highest and the closest, or the lowest and the closest. The model that would
enable these options would be a square, not a circle. But, the circle is not just
about limiting the extremes, which it does at its periphery. All these extremes,
even when limited, are severely asymmetrical, while beauty somehow finds sym-
metry between aloofness and outreach. It is the symmetry that occurs when the
hands of Apollo, one holding the bow and the other the Graces, are on the same
level. Beauty, then, is the middle of all middling – the hub of the wheel – which is
the most difficult position to occupy in the circular spectrum. It does two things
simultaneously, finds an uncharted middle between two sets of variables, to
achieve closure while opening, stoppage while moving, and, of course, moderation
while exceeding.
    Apollo’s paradigm – mēdèn ágan (“nothing in excess”) – is anything but a te-
dious call for moderation; he is calling for moderation of excess. And the difficulty
lies precisely in the fact that the two are not of the same order: you cannot simply
stop halfway to excess. The problem cannot be solved with mere linearity. Con-
sidering the question of moderation is equal to asking how things come to a close
or how things find their end. Apollo has been wrongfully accused of being the
single-minded, proto-Christian anti-Dionysus, a teetotaler god. But he does some-
thing far more difficult than abstaining: he drinks and finds a way to stop. The
German Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling clearly distinguished the “Apol-
lonian inspiration from the merely Dionysian” as being “simultaneously intoxi-
cated and sober.”54 Dionysus merely follows monoaxial linearity in his quest for
rapture – nothing could be easier. On the other hand, the Apollonian dual state
cannot be resolved by dividing oneself in two, into a rational, moderating mind
and a body thirsty for excess, since the mind would quickly concede after intox-
ication. Contradiction and ambiguity never solved anything. No, the two forces
need to be mediated: the question can only be solved as one act, that is, as an
equation. Here, a single act is not a continuation of doing one thing until the point
of exhaustion. A single act relies on a curved trajectory: it starts in one direction
and comes to a close in another. Apollo shoots upward while aiming forward. The
Apollonian paradigm means that everything, whatever it does, needs to take a
turn.
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visible and public, like all things under the sun. Even in its most minimalist and
quietist state of being dried up, the river is centrifugal (or radiant), simply because
calling it centripetal (or withdrawn) would constitute an “as-if” statement, not an
ontological one. As if the river could hide from us. Or, even more curiously, as if
it could hide from itself. Ontologically speaking, all things come toward us, what-
ever state they are in – that is, all the possible states things can be in are ways of
coming toward us. However, this does not mean things are in the process of being
received; we should radically distinguish between gift and reception. A gift is out-
reach, not intake. The given reaches out to relate but is not related just yet.51 A
more radical conflation of the for-itself and the for-others is hardly conceivable,
and the depth of radiance is the only concept that allows us to appreciate the ex-
istence of things as being neither isolated or related. Every change in the river’s
appearance, even those related to drying up, immediately adds to the depth of its
mosaic presence, not to its absence. 
    What we call the river is itself an ontological device that moves from one state
to the next over time, each state defined by a specific segment of the aesthetic
spectrum. And that spectrum must take a circular form, since the river’s metamor-
phoses are cyclical: every change is bound to be repeated at some point. Its won-
drous state of serenity in the morning; its sublime state of violence after a long
period of rain; its common state, with a breeze leaving its imprint on the water;
its magnificence when swollen; and its boring, dried-up state in summer – they
all accumulate via a system of sharp contrasts and subtle nuances into a mosaic
appearance that is itself biaxial. Even a thing in its most sublime or most common
state is obliged to call in the help of Apollo to reconcile outreach and depth. The
profound or sublime is required to be presentable in order to become part of the
gift cycle, and a shallow, common appearance must exceed its material contours
or else it cannot act as a gift. Again, the cross limits itself in a wheel. When things
have so many ways of combining the vertical and the horizontal – that is, so many
modes of radiance, or styles of being, if not proper fashions of being – it logically
follows that when fitted together they will form a radial, circular object. The ques-
tion then arises of how much beauty overlaps with those modes that are deemed
not-beautiful but sublime, common, boring, magnificent or otherwise, since each
of those instances is part of the same biaxial systemacy.52
    Beauty is not a simple striving for the deepest (on one axis) or furthest (on the
other), nor is it enough to call it a mere linking of the two, since all modes of ra-
diance are equations between the two axes. No, beauty is what Plato famously
called metaxu: it needs to find the middle between them. Of course, the notion of
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Yes, the gods are elusive and remote – and Apollo more than most – but they are
not detached. In his Homeric Gods of 1929, Walter Otto is adamant about the an-
cient Greeks sharing a realm of pure presence and outwardness with their gods.
The Greeks idolized presence. Certainly, when gods manifest themselves to mortals,
they necessarily appear in disguise, but they do so to prevent humans from devel-
oping unhealthy inwardness or subjectivity.59 In Otto’s own words, “the soul only
faces outward, as it were, towards the world of forms, not inward, towards an in-
visible realm accessible only to itself.”60 Every time Odysseus is on the brink of
taking a decision, he encounters a divinity who inspires or seduces him to take a
certain action. In the Homeric world, thoughts and feelings roam outside of us in
the form of manifestations. We feel things, yes, but we do not own our feelings;
they are part of incessant – and public – cycles of exchange. Greek psychology
consisted of relationships between visibilities, not between repressed secrets and
visible actions, as modern psychology does. The gods of the Greeks spared them
an unconscious. However, the manifest cannot be reduced to what we customarily
describe as the visible world; it is an infinitely thicker and denser realm – a plenum
– of swirling metamorphoses, where models are scaled up and down and likenesses
thrown on and off like fashionable cloaks. The abundance of stopping and moving
can only exist because thought coincides with seeing, that is, because of epipha-
nies. 
    Such is not the case with the slowly acquired alternative meaning of “epiph-
any,” revelation, which likewise comes as a shock but arrives from another world
altogether, bursting through the barrier between the invisible and the visible. Man-
ifestation follows the radiant model of the sun, of illumination as a gift, while rev-
elation follows that of lightning, in which all things hidden are suddenly unveiled
and uncovered. The difference between manifestation and revelation might seem
a subtle one, especially since their connotations have become so intertwined, as,
for instance, in the case of the Freudian distinction between the manifest and the
latent, which misplaces the manifest in the category of the revealed. Both terms
embody the meaning of a manufacture of visibilities, of the sometimes forceful
way things make us see. The manifest makes itself visible to us, while the revealed
is the invisible becoming visible, that is, something that lies beneath – truth, forces,
secrets – rising to the surface. The manifest never emerges from the invisible; it
might not be in view, it might be disguised or too much to apprehend at one mo-
ment, but it is fundamentally of the order of presence. Manifestation is the moment
of shock when all perspectives cumulate into one thick image, as in the moment
when the novelist Charles Dickens, sitting in a coffee room in London, suddenly
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    And again, our wanderings have led us back to the principle of radiance mod-
eled on the sun, which combines the verticality of transcendence and the hori-
zontality of connectivity, in a way similar to how both methexis and mimesis
should be understood as operating in Plato’s (I) cyclical model, as we concluded
earlier. The fact is, the circle of the cycle incorporates the purely vertical ladder of
Plato II. Something similar occurs with the notion of insight, which – when con-
sidered as a seeing-through – seems to refer to pure verticalism only, to a flash of
lightning, while the seeing-more refers to the cyclic nature of the sun. Both forms
of insight we should classify as an epiphany, a word that is almost the identical
twin of ekphanestaton. The latter appears only twice in Plato’s works and was
never absorbed into other languages; it is only thanks to Martin Heidegger, and
followers such as Hannah Arendt and Hans-Georg Gadamer who regularly made
use of it, that we are aware of its existence. In sharp contrast, the term “epiphany”
has an enormously rich and long history that stretches from ancient mystery cults
to the Christian liturgy of the Epiphany, and to Wordsworth’s “radiant geometry,”55
James Joyce’s writing technique and Levinas’ philosophy of facing the Other –
and it offers an equally wide variety of meanings. Originally, epiphanies would
appear “either in a dream or in a waking vision”; during special rituals, they took
the form of oracles, such as those spoken in the Temple of Apollo in Delphi.56 Or-
acles would be uttered on the seventh of the month by the Pythia, a female
priestess who prepared for days on end to enter a trance and make contact with
Apollo, who “entered into her and used her vocal organs as if they were his
own.”57 Again, it is important to stress that Dionysus did not have an exclusive
right to rapture, Rausch and ecstasy; those were just as much a part of Apollonian
epiphanies. To describe the two gods as operating interdependently – if not fra-
ternally58 – at Delphi would be more correct than describing them as being in
deep opposition, as the young Nietzsche did in The Birth of Tragedy.
    Though “epiphany,” similarly to ekphanestaton, has its etymological roots in
the concept of “shining forth,” it adds a different connotation of suddenness and
even violence. We are definitely struck during an epiphany; the circumstances
under which the god appears are almost always extraordinary, and the apparition
shows up either through a painstaking, lengthy ritual or completely unexpectedly.
“Epiphany” originally meant a manifestation of the divinity, and the word “man-
ifest” literally signifies the act of striking by hand, which, in the context of gift-
giving, adds to the concept’s importance. Granted, a manifestation is the most
extreme form of gift-giving, since it can hit us like a slap in the face, but as a gift
it also hands out or hands over and hence essentially shares the same space as us.
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some philosophers, such as Schelling, have located in the deep, and others in the
high. 
    Zeus, according to Walter Burkert, should be considered a god of the sky and
the weather more than of the sun.69 Weather, in its constant moving toward and
away from form, is the specific domain of the dynamical sublime, as we know so
well from Turner’s paintings. The sublime inhabits the vertical axis of the high
and the elevated, the Erhabene, and can appear on earth only as shock and awe,
because it necessarily opens up to the formless, or better, to the formlessness of
truth. More than a god of the weather and the sky, Zeus should be considered a
classic thunder god, i.e., a god of terror – a feeling Kant denoted with the German
term Schreckhaft-Erhabene, “the terrifying sublime.” Longinus, the first official
theoretician of the sublime, makes extensive use in Peri Hypsous of the terrifying
to describe the epiphanic character of sublimity, which he aligns with the power
of lightning striking from above, moving the subject “out of himself” (ekstasis)
and overpowering him with “irresistible force”70 – the irresistible force of the un-
speakable word of logos appearing as a flash of light and coming down on us like
the crack of Zeus’s whip.71 During Heidegger’s seminar on Heraclitus, the philoso-
pher remembered a moment when he was traveling to the Greek island of Aegina:
“Suddenly I saw a single bolt of lightning, after which no more followed. My
thought was: Zeus.”72
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realized the window, viewed from inside, said MOOR EEFFOC – an epiphany that
Chesterton called “the motto of all effective realism,” in which the fantastic merges
with fact, and thought with seeing.61
    The revealed, on the other hand, is of a wholly different order, that of the prin-
cipally invisible – the order of absence, which needs to be distorted and violently
forced into the visible if it is to show itself. For example:
   
Bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuon-
nthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!62
This is the first of the ten thunderclaps that structure James Joyce’s Finnegans
Wake, each indicated by an onomatopoeic, oracular “hundredlettered word.”63
Joyce firmly believed in epiphanies as moments of revelation and as slips of the
tongue, even as foul language. Unlike MOOR EEFFOC, his thunderclap is a word
that comes from yonder (“thunder, yunder”), the place where no appearances or
manifestations are allowed. It is a cry. Manifestation is still part of Plato’s identi-
fication of beauty with the good: it may be an extreme gift, coming as a shock,
but it is beneficial nonetheless. A revelation, on the other hand, replaces the good
with the true, and to do so successfully, it likewise has to replace beauty with the
sublime.64 Revelation is the bolt of lightning that crackles down the vertical axis
without the least inclination of horizontality: it merely clatters down on earth. It
is a sound more than an image, indeed a clap, a word on which Finnegans Wake
offers many variations: “acclapadad,” “clapperclaws,” “clipperclappers,” “clapper-
coupling,” “claptrap.” For Heraclitus, the “thunderbolt that steers all things”65 is
the word of logos, but since it needs to speak the unspeakable, or “represent the
unrepresentable,” it takes on a distorted and violent form.66 In wanting to show
itself, the sublime needs to accept the conditions of the arena of presence, which
it can do only by bursting in, by breaking through from one dimension to the
other: the two axes have now become two distinct worlds. The sublime, then, re-
sorts to a pure overpowering without empowering, a pure gift without return, a
father without a son, Zeus without Apollo. The sublime and truth seek the un-
negotiable, the naked, white and purified, but can only come to us in an impure
form, since for them, form is by definition impure. Plato (II) resolutely associates
the true with the “colorless (achromatos), formless (aschematistos), and truly in-
tangible,”67 in a statement that will later evolve into Kant’s association of the sub-
lime with formlessness.68 The sublime is the realm of forces without form, which
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